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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kirk Lee Pendergrass appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional plea of guilty to driving without privileges and without proof of 
insurance. Pendergrass claims the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While on patrol, Officer Chris Olsen saw a Toyota pickup and entered its 
license plate number into his onboard computer system. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 10, L. 
11-p. 11, L. 5; p. 16, Ls. 1-15.) Records showed the registered owner was 
Pendergrass. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 16, L. 22 - p. 17, L. 8.) Olsen then searched 
Pendergrass' driving records and learned that his driving privileges were 
suspended. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-14.) Olsen also accessed a previous 
booking photo of Pendergrass through Ada County's booking system. (6/18/12 
Tr., p. 21, Ls. 16-18.) 
Olsen lost sight of the Toyota, but ten minutes later, saw it again. 
(6/18/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 4-8.) Olsen still had Pendergrass' booking photo up on 
his computer, and determined the driver was Pendergrass. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, 
Ls. 18-21.) Olsen initiated a traffic stop, based on the information that 
Pendergrass' driving privileges were suspended. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 3-9; p. 
22, Ls. 20-21.) Pendergrass was charged with driving without privileges and 
without proof of insurance. (R., pp. 5-7.) 
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Pendergrass moved to suppress all evidence before the magistrate court, 
arguing Olsen lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop him because 
there was inadequate time for Olsen to have identified him. (R., pp. 24-30.) At a 
hearing on the motion, both Olsen and Pendergrass testified. (See 6/18/12 Tr.) 
The magistrate concluded Olsen had valid reason to stop Pendergrass and 
denied the motion. (R., pp. 53-59.) 
Pendergrass entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to 
appeal the magistrate's order denying his suppression motion. (R., p. 62.) 
Pendergrass timely appealed to the district court. (R., pp. 64, 66-68.) The 
district court heard oral argument (see 2/20/13 Tr.), and on consideration of the 
parties' arguments and the record, including a transcript of the suppression 
hearing, the district court affirmed the magistrate's order (R., pp. 114-21). 
Pendergrass again timely appealed. (R., pp. 123-25.) 
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ISSUES 
Pendergrass states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Officer have a reasonable, articulable susp1c1on the 
registered owner of the vehicle was the actual driver before 
initiating the traffic stop? 
2. Did the magistrate court err when it concluded the Officer, in fact, 
identified the Appellant as the driver of the vehicle even though the 
testimony and dashboard video clearly do not support the ruling, 
and therefore should the evidence that Mr. Pendergrass was 
driving be suppressed? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Pendergrass failed to show that the magistrate and district courts erred in 




Pendergrass Has Failed To Show That The Magistrate And District Courts Erred 
In Concluding That Officer Olsen Had A Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To 
Stop Pendergrass' Vehicle 
A. Introduction 
Pendergrass does not challenge that Officer Olsen properly determined 
the vehicle's registered owner lacked a valid driver's license. (Appellant's brief, 
p. 7.) But Pendergrass argues that Olsen lacked information to verify that the 
vehicle's registered owner was also its driver when Olsen initiated the stop. (Id.) 
According to Pendergrass, the magistrate and "district court on review" erred in 
concluding Olsen had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Pendergrass was 
both the registered owner and driver of the vehicle at the time of the stop. (Id.) 
Pendergrass further contends the magistrate's factual findings are unsupported 
by the record and are thus clearly erroneous. (Id.) Under the applicable 
standard of review and Idaho law, Pendergrass' arguments fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court directly reviews a decision by a district court made in 
its appellate capacity. State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). The appellate court accepts the magistrate's 
factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely 
reviews legal conclusions. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708, 239 P.3d 811, 
813 (Ct. App. 2010); Decker, 152 Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732. Where the 
magistrate's decision is supported by the record and law, and where the district 
court affirmed, the appellate court will affirm "as a matter of procedure." kl_ 
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Review of an order granting or denying a suppression motion is 
bifurcated. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 592, 261 P.3d 853, 869 (2011) 
(citation omitted). First, the appellate court accepts the trial court's factual 
findings "unless they are clearly erroneous." kl Then, regarding application of 
the law to those facts, the appellate court exercises free review. kl 
Determinations regarding witness credibility and the weight to be given 
competing evidence at the suppression hearing are within the trial court's 
discretion. State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 705, _, 291 P.3d 44, 53 (Ct. App. 
2012) (citations omitted). 
C. Pendergrass Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The Magistrate's Factual 
Finding 
The magistrate found that Officer Olsen "identified Pendergrass as the 
driver of the Toyota truck, turned around, accelerated and stopped 
Pendergrass." (R., pp. 57-58.) Contrary to Pendergrass' assertions on appeal, 
the magistrate's findings are supported by the record. (Appellant's brief, p. 11-
13.) At the hearing on Pendergrass' suppression motion, Officer Olsen testified 
that he saw a vehicle and did a search of its license plate using his in-car 
computer system; it showed the vehicle's registered owner was Pendergrass. 
(6/18/12 Tr., p. 9, L. 24 - p. 10, L. 12.) Olsen then did a search of Pendergrass' 
driver's license and learned that Pendergrass' driving privileges were suspended. 
(6/18/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 12-14.) Olsen also accessed Pendergrass' driving record 
and a prior booking photo. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 20, L. 25 - p. 21, L. 22.) 
Olsen lost sight of Pendergrass' vehicle. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 3-5.) But 
ten minutes later, with Pendergrass' booking photo still on his computer screen, 
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Olsen saw the vehicle again. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 5-8; p. 22, Ls. 18-19.) 
Comparing his visual of the driver to the photo, Olsen confirmed the driver was 
Pendergrass and initiated the stop. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 20-25.) 
The magistrate's findings comport with Olsen's testimony. (R., pp. 54-
55.) In addition, the magistrate found that Olsen "did not recall his exact location 
when he first viewed the Toyota driven by Pendergrass," and that Olsen "most 
likely identified Pendergrass as the driver" when he passed Pendergrass' truck 
the second time, rather than when he initially spotted the truck. (R., pp. 54-55; 
see also 6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, L. 22 - p. 23, L. 4.) 
Pendergrass challenges as "clearly erroneous" the magistrate's finding 
that Olsen confirmed that the driver was Pendergrass before he initiated the 
stop. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) In support, Pendergrass cites Olsen's testimony 
that he "can't say exactly how it happened," only what is "most likely." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12; 6/18/12 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 3-4 (emphasis added).) 
Pendergrass thus argues that Olsen "could not testify with any certainty when, 
where or how he identified Mr. Pendergrass as the actual driver." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 12.) Pendergrass' argument ignores the context of Olsen's testimony, 
and thus mischaracterizes it. 
When asked if he identified Pendergrass as the driver when he pulled him 
over, Olsen testified, without uncertainty or qualification, "Yes ... I was able to 
see him, and the photo, and confirm it was him when I turned around to stop 
him." (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 16-21.) When then asked if, "[p]rior to that, you 
wouldn't have identified [Pendergrass] as the driver ... ?" Olsen responded that 
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he could not say exactly how it happened, but could only "give you most likely." 
(6/18/12 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 1-4 (emphasis added).) Consistent with this testimony, it 
is possible that Olsen pulled up the booking photo fast enough that he saw and 
identified Pendergrass before losing sight of him. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 1-4.) 
But whether or not Olsen did so is irrelevant. It is also immaterial that Olsen did 
not recall "exactly how it happened." (6/18/12 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 3-4.) Of relevance 
was Olsen's definitive testimony that he recognized Pendergrass from the photo 
before stopping his vehicle. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 16-25.) 
In a further attempt to show clear error, Pendergrass points to Olsen's 
dashboard video, which was admitted at the suppression hearing as Exhibit A. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12; see Exhibit A; see also 6/18/12 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 13-19.) 
According to Pendergrass, this evidence shows "it is highly unlikely that Officer 
Olsen could have identified" him as the driver given that they "passed each other 
at a significant rate of speed." (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
The actual speeds at which Olsen and Pendergrass were driving do not 
appear to have been measured; this information was not offered or admitted as 
evidence. Pendergrass established no basis for relying on the accuracy of his 
testimony that he was driving "27 miles an hour," and that Olsen was driving, in 
the opposite direction, "[b]etween 25 and 30." (6/18/12 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 13-19.) 
The video admitted as Exhibit A provides no demonstrable support that the 
vehicles were traveling at a "significant rate of speed." (Exhibit A.) As such, the 
record does not support Pendergrass' claim that Olsen could not have identified 
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Pendergrass given the vehicles' speeds. Pendergrass thus fails to show clear 
error in this regard. 
Finally, Pendergrass notes that he testified he was wearing a beanie, 
sunglasses, and bulky coat when Olsen saw him. (Appellant's brief, p. 12; 
6/18/12 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 21-22.) At the suppression hearing, Olsen did not say -
nor was he asked - whether Pendergrass was wearing a hat, coat, or 
sunglasses at the time of the incident. In fact, Olsen was not asked about any 
impediments to his identification of Pendergrass. (See 6/18/12 Tr.,' p. 22, L. 1 -
p. 23, L. 4.) Olsen's testimony, which was strengthened rather than diminished 
by cross-examination, was that he identified Pendergrass based on the booking 
photo. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 20-21.) 
The magistrate weighed the evidence and found, in keeping with Olsen's 
testimony, that Olsen saw the photo and confirmed the driver was Pendergrass 
before he initiated the traffic stop. This finding was supported by substantial 
evidence, and Pendergrass has failed to demonstrate any basis to disturb it on 
review. Mangum, 153 Idaho at_, 291 P.3d at 53. 
D. Applying The Law To The Facts Found By The Magistrate, Officer Olsen 
Had A Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Stop Pendergrass' Vehicle 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). To 
conduct an investigatory stop in accord with the Fourth Amendment, police must 
have "a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that 'criminal activity 
may be afoot .... "' U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citation omitted); see 
also State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, _, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2013). The 
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suspicion on which an investigatory stop is based must be more than "a mere 
hunch." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59, 266 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Ct. App. 
2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). But the required quantity and 
quality of information is less than that needed to establish probable cause. 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 
811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). In evaluating the validity of an investigatory 
detention, the reviewing court looks to the "totality of circumstances" known to 
the arresting officer at the time. Johnson, 152 Idaho at 59, 266 P.3d at 1164 
(citation omitted). 
The magistrate found that Officer Olsen saw a vehicle and learned that its 
registered owner was Pendergrass, and that Pendergrass' driving privileges were 
suspended. (R., p. 54.) Olsen then saw a booking photograph of Pendergrass. 
(R., p. 54.) After losing sight of the vehicle, Olsen saw it again, and identified 
Pendergrass as the driver before initiating a stop of the vehicle. (R., pp. 57-58.) 
As already discussed, these findings are supported by the record. (See supra.) 
Given these circumstances, Olsen had well more than a hunch that the driver 
was engaged in unlawful activity - in other words, that Pendergrass was driving 
with a suspended license. See Johnson, 152 Idaho at 59, 266 P.3d at 1164. 
In arguing that police lacked a legal basis to stop his vehicle, Pendergrass 
misreads the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 117 
P.3d 876 (Ct. App. 2005). In Cerino, police received an anonymous tip that "a 
white Nissan pickup bearing 1 B (Bannock County) license plates was 
transporting illegal drugs." ~ at 737, 117 P.3d at 877. A detective saw a truck 
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matching that description parked at a residence, and learned from dispatch that 
it was registered to Silas and Robin Cerino. ~ When the detective saw a man 
leave the residence and drive away in the vehicle, he asked dispatch to check 
Silas Cerino's driver's license; dispatch informed him that Silas Cerino did not 
have an Idaho driver's license. ~ A fellow officer stopped the driver for 
operating a vehicle without a valid license; upon confirming the man was Cerino, 
the officer arrested him for driving without a license. Id. Later, officers 
discovered methamphetamine in the vehicle, and Cerino was charged with 
possession. ~ 
Cerino moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the officer's 
investigative stop, but the district court denied the motion. ~ On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals reversed. ~ at 738-39, 117 P.3d at 878-79. The Court held 
that the anonymous tip, plus the unrelated information that the vehicle's male 
owner lacked an Idaho driver's license did not amount to reasonable suspicion 
that the driver was involved in criminal activity. ~ Cerino is distinguishable from 
Pendergrass' case on its facts. 
In Cerino, the Court noted that the police "had no information as to 
whether Cerino held a driver's license from another jurisdiction," which would 
have permitted Cerino to lawfully drive. ~ at 738, 117 P.3d at 878. Here, the 
police knew Pendergrass' driving privileges were suspended such that he could 
not lawfully drive. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-14.) The Cerino Court also found it 
significant that the police had no physical description of Cerino, except his 
gender. Cerino, 141 Idaho at 738, 117 P.3d at 878. Here, Officer Olsen had a 
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photograph of Pendergrass with which to confirm the driver's identity before 
stopping the vehicle. (6/18/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 18-21.) Given the totality of 
circumstances, Olsen had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop 
Pendergrass' vehicle. 
Pendergrass' remaining argument misreads the magistrate court's 
analysis, and in any event, ignores that this Court exercises free review in 
applying the law to the facts. According to Pendergrass, the magistrate court 
erred by "not taking into consideration whether Officer Olsen identified Mr. 
Pendergrass as the driver of the vehicle . . .. " (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
Pendergrass bases this assertion on the magistrate's conclusion that there was 
a valid reason for Olsen's stop because "Pendergrass' driving privileges were 
suspended." (Appellant's brief, p. 11; R., p. 59.) 
Pendergrass' argument ignores the magistrate's finding, earlier in the 
order, that Olsen "identified Pendergrass as the driver of that truck." (R., pp. 55, 
59.) Examining the findings and analysis of the order, and not just the 
concluding paragraph, the magistrate properly found both that the officer 
identified Pendergrass as the vehicle's driver and that Pendergrass was engaged 
in criminal activity - driving with a suspended license. (R., p. 59.) Because 
issues of law are freely reviewed on appeal, this Court applies the law to the 
magistrate's findings, regardless of the magistrate's legal conclusions. Draper, 
151 Idaho at 592, 261 P.3d at 869. As already discussed, correct application of 
the law to the magistrate's findings shows that Pendergrass' motion to suppress 
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was properly denied. Therefore, the district court's order affirming the denial of 
Pendergrass' suppression motion must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order affirming the magistrate court's denial of Pendergrass' motion to suppress. 
DATED this 5th day of November, 2013. 
DAPHN J.HUANG 
Deputy Attorney General 
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